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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES G. CLAWSON and 1 
JOAN M. CLAWSON, his wife; 
TEX R. OLSEN and 
MONNA LEE OLSEN, his wife; and 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN and j 
JEANNINE W. CHAMBERLAIN, 
' Plaintiffs and Respondents, I Case No. 
[ 13653 
vs. 
BRUCE L. MOESSER and I 
RUTH ANNE MOESSER, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. \ 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to certain real prop-
erty located in Sanpete County, State of Utah. Both Ap-
pellants and Respondents have claimed legal title in the 
property. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The case was heard by the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Judge for the District Court of Sanpete 
County, State of Utah. The matter came on before the 
court on the 16th day of January, 1974, at Manti, Coun-
ty of Sanpete, State of Utah, on Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Plaintiffs (R. 9) and by the De-
fendants (R. 74), each representing that there are no 
disputed issues of fact, and each of which motions was 
supported by affidavits, documentary exhibits, and sup-
porting briefs. The court granted plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The court also held that the re-
demption by C. H . Spaulding was valid and terminated 
the rights of Walker Bank under their trust deed and 
foreclosure proceedings. The Plaintiff was further or-
dered to reimburse Defendant for the amounts Defend-
ant had paid on 1973 property taxes on the subject prop-
erty (R, 97). 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of the judg-
ment entered by the lower court against them and seek 
judgment in their favor as a matter of law, and an order 
of the court quieting title to the property in the Defend-
ants-Appellants, hereinafter referred to as Appellants, 
and against the Plaintiffs-Respondents, hereinafter re-
ferred to as Respondents. 
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S T A T E M E N T OF I A 
The property in question is locates »'u Sanpete 
County, and is described as follows; 
"The N.E. Y4 and the E . y2 of the S.E. 14 of 
Section 31, Township 15 So. Range 15 E.5 Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, Containing 240 Acres," 
The property is sometimes described as the following lots 
under the recorded plat of Spring City Rancheros: 
"Lots 1 through 6; 8 through 12; I I through 17; 
19 through 22; 24; 25; 29 through 32; and 37 
through 44, all numbers inclusive." 
Stanley Title Co. held fee simple title in the sub-
ject property, and on October 1, 1965 conveyed title to 
C. H . Spaulding and Mid-Continent Construction Co. 
(R. 14) .,.. . .
 :. . 
Mid-Continent Construction Co. conveyed a war-
ranty deed for Lot No. 2 to the Nielsons on September 
6 196(5 (R. 45) . 
Two days later, Mid-Continent Construction Co. 
entered into a trust deed agreement with Walker Bank 
and Trust Co., on September 8, 1966, with Mid-Contin-
ent Construction Co. as the trustor and Walker Bank 
and Trust Co. as the trustee, and beneficiary (R. 46). 
April 10, 1969, the Clawsons had executed on a 
judgment against C. H . Spaulding, and a Sheriff's sale 
was had on the property at which time the Clawsons pur-
chased the subject property (R. 50). 
3 
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On July 25, 1969, a "Lis Pendens" was filed by 
Walker Bank and Trust Co. against C. H . Spaulding, 
Mid-Continent Construction Co., and the Clawsons, to 
prevent any further action being taken until Walker 
Bank & Trust Co.'s foreclosure proceedings against C. 
I I . Spaulding, Mid-Continent Construction Co. and the 
Clawsons had been concluded (R. 52). 
On the basis of the Clawsons' purchase at the pre-
vious Sheriff's sale, on October 16, 1969 a sheriff's deed 
was conveyed to the Clawsons for the subject property, 
(R. 54), which conveyance took place after Walker 
Bank's foreclosure had begun. 
On October 25, 1969, the Clawsons entered into a 
stipulation with Walker Bank and Trust Co. whereby 
the Clawsons stipulated that Walker Bank and Trust 
Co.'s trust deed had priority over any claim the Claw-
sons might have to the subject property (R. 56). 
On November 6, 1969, a judgment was filed in the 
foreclosure proceedings in favor of Walker Bank and 
Trust Co., and against C. H . Spaulding, Mid-Continent 
Construction Co., and the Clawsons (R. 15). 
Pursuant to the judgment and the foreclosure pro-
ceedings by Walker Bank and Trust Co., on December 
30, 1969 a Sheriff's sale was conducted on the subject 
property, and the property was sold to Keith McArthur 
(R. 20). 
On January 22, 1970, a deficiency judgment was 
entered in favor of Walker Bank & Trust Co. and 
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against C. IT. Spaulding, Mid-Continent Construction 
Co., and the Clawsons, the deficiency judgment being 
based on the previous foreclosure proceedings (R. 21). 
C. H . Spaulding redeemed from the Sheriff's sale 
to Keith McArthur on June 30, 1970 (R. 23). 
On July 28, 1971 the Clawsons, Oisens, and Cham-
berlains conveyed to James Clawson, Tex Olsen and 
Ken Chamberlain by quit claim deed (R. 66). 
On February 12,1973, Walker Bank and Trust Co. 
executed on their deficiency judgment based on the 
trust deed foreclosure proceedings against C. H . Spauld-
ing, Mid-Continent Construction Co. and the Clawsons, 
and the Moessers purchased the subject property at the 
sheriff's sale on March 21, 1973. Six months later on 
September 24,1973, a Sheriff's deed was conveyed to the 
Moessers, granting them title in fee simple to the sub-
ject property (R. 25, 27, 32). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
T H A T T H E F O R E C L O S U R E P R O C E E D I N G S 
I N S T I T U T E D B Y W A L K E R BANK A N D 
T R U S T CO. D I S C H A R G E D A L L R I G H T S 
A N D ENCUMBRANCES O F T H E R E S P O N D -
E N T S I N T H E S U B J E C T P R O P E R T Y . 
Both by stipulation and by law, at the time of the 
Walker Bank foreclosure suit against Spaulding, Mid-
5 
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Continent Construction Co., and the Clawsons; Walker 
Bank had an interest in the subject property superior to 
that of the Respondents. On October 25, 1969, Olsen 
and Chamberlain, as counsel for Respondents, filed a 
stipulation in the District Court of Sanpete County, 
Utah, in the case bearing Civil No. 5857, stating as fol-
lows: 
"Come now the defendants, James G. Clawson 
and Joan M. Clawson, and by and through their 
attorney, Tex R. Olsen, do hereby stipulate that 
the plaintiffs' trust deed has priority over any 
right, title or interest of said defendants in said 
property and the interest of the defendant was 
acquired subsequent to the filing of said instru-
ment by the plaintiff. Stipulated to this 25th day 
of October, A.D., 1969." (R. 56). 
This stipulation signed and filed by Respondents effec-
tively placed them in a position subordinate to that of 
Walker Bank and Trust Co. relating to the subject 
property. When Walker Bank foreclosed on its mort-
gage, by law all rights of the Respondents were effec-
tively discharged concerning the subject property. This 
is the law as cited at 59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 523: 
"I t is generally held that a complete and valid 
foreclosure discharges all rights, claims, mort-
gages, or other encumbrances acquired subse-
quent to the date of the mortgage foreclosed . . . 
and it has been held that the lien of the junior 
encumbrancer is not destroyed, but . . . is trans-
ferred from the land to the surplus foreclosure 
fund." 
The same fate meets liens other than those created by 
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mortgages, as is explained at 59 C.J.S., Mortgages Sec-
tion 800: 
"As a general rule, the lien of a junior encum-
brance, cut off by the foreclosure of a mortgage, 
is transferred in equity to the surplus foreclosure 
fund . . . the foregoing rules have been held to 
apply not only to the case of a junior mortgagee 
but also to a junior creditor by judgment, execu-
tion, or attachment. . . . " 
I t is the law in the State of Utah that a junior en-
cumbrancer who is joined and properly served in an 
action by a senior mortgagee to foreclose his mortgage, 
loses all claims against the subject property. In Cowan 
v. Stoker, 100 Ut. 377, 115 P.2d 153 (1941), the Utah 
Supreme Court decided that the appellant, a junior 
mortgagee, could not receive certain surplus monies de-
rived from a foreclosure proceeding which had been in-
stituted by the senior mortgagee. In its decision, the 
court stated: 
"A junior mortgagee who is joined and properly 
served in an action by a senior mortgagee to fore-
close his mortgage, whether or not he appears or 
pleads, is bound by the decree of foreclosure and 
mag not thereafter assert a claim against said 
mortgaged property•." [citations omitted] Id. at 
154 (Emphasis added). 
The court held that the lien of the junior encumbrancer 
was effectively discharged by the foreclosure on the 
senior encumbrance, and then continued to explain the 
proper procedure that a junior encumbrancer should 
follow: 
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"Upon foreclosure of the senior mortgage the 
lien of the junior mortgagee attaches to the sur-
plus of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. [Ci-
tations omitted]" Id. at 154. 
The court then directed its attention to the question of 
whether the appellant had adopted the proper procedure 
for asserting its claim for the surplus funds—not for the 
subject property—in the courts. 
In the recent Oregon decision of Call v. Jeremiah, 
246 Ore. 568, 425 P.2d 502 (1967), the Oregon court 
quoted with approval the ahove-cited language of the 
Utah Supreme Court, and reaffirmed that decision. Re-
ferring back to the Oregon court's decision in Ulrieh v. 
Lincoln Realty, 180 Ore. 380, 175 P.2d 149 (1946), 
also cited in Respondents' Brief the court said: 
"Plaintiffs misconceived the purpose of fore-
closure proceedings and the effect of the fore-
closure decree. The effect of the foreclosure de-
cree is not simply to extinguish the interest of the 
mortgagee bringing the suit—it is designed to 
extinguish all interests which are subordinate to 
the foreclosing mortgagee's interest" Id. at 504 
(Emphasis added and by the court). 
In the present situation, then, it must be held that the 
foreclosure of the senior mortgage—which mortgage 
was superior under the terms of the 1969 stipulation— 
effectively extinguished all rights of the Clawsons or 
their successors in the property. The court went on to 
describe the position of one who purchases at the sheriff's 
sale or redeems, such as Spaulding, in relation to a 
junior encumbrancer, such as the Clawsons and Olsens. 
8 
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". .r/the judgment or decree therein destroys his 
(the junior encumbrancer's) lien, and upon the 
expiration of the time for redemption, the pur-
chaser is entitled to the property free from the 
lien. The subsequent mortgagor or lienor is re-
mitted to the fund realized in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings. . . ." Id. at 504. 
The same rule was followed, and the Utah Stoker de-
cision, supra, was cited as authority, in the recent case of 
In Re Castillian Apartments, Inc., 281 N.C. 709, 190 
S.E. 2d 161, 162 (1972). 
As previously stated, the rule which extinguishes a 
junior encumbrance upon the foreclosure proceedings 
on a senior encumbrance applies also to executions, at-
tachments and other types of junior encumbrances apart 
from mortgages. Therefore, at the time that Walker 
Bank foreclosed its mortgage, Respondents' rights to 
the subject property were effectively discharged and 
Respondents had to look for any satisfaction on their 
debt to the surplus foreclosure fund. Any interest that 
the Clawsons may have had in the subject property as a 
junior encumbrancer to Walker Bank was effectively 
extinguished by Walker Bank's foreclosure action, to 
which Respondents were joined (R. 15). 
Also, in cases where the mortgagor redeems and 
the junior encumbrancer fails to redeem, as occurred 
here (R. 23), there is a large body of case law to the 
effect that: 
"The lien of a junior mortgage is lost by the fail-
ure of a junior mortgagee, a party to the proceed-
9 
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ing, to redeem from the foreclosure of the senior 
mortgage, and . . . such lien does not again be-
come a lien on the property, on the mortgage 
debtor's redemption from the senior mortgage." 
59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 875 (c). 
The claim of the Clawsons would, therefore, be lost as 
of the date of Spaulding's redemption from the fore-
closure sale. 
P O I N T I I . 
T H A T T H E R E D E M P T I O N BY C. H . 
S P A U L D I N G W A S V A L I D A N D V E S T E D 
T I T L E TO T H E S U B J E C T P R O P E R T Y I N 
H I M , AS W A S H E L D BY T H E D I S T R I C T 
COURT. 
Appellants do not question the finding of the court, 
as expressed in the court's Order of February 4, 1974, 
that the redemption by C. H . Spaulding was a valid re-
demption (R. 97). Under the law, Spaulding was en-
titled to redeem from the Sheriff's sale, 59 C.J.S., Mort-
gages Section 819 (b), states, concerning redemption 
statutes, 
". . . the construction in any case of doubt or am-
biguity should be in favor of the right to redeem 
and to the end that the property of the debtor may 
pay as many of his debts as possible.. . ." 
Respondents claim at page 5 of the lower court Memo-
randum (R 82) that no re-sale for a deficiency judg-
10 
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ment can take place if the property was redeemed by 
the Clawsons. Eut the property in this case was not 
redeemed by the Clawsons; it was redeemed by Spauld-
ing, the mortgagor (R 23, 97). The Clawsons made no 
attempt to redeem, and subsequently forfeited any 
alleged rights they may have had in the property. There-
fore, the property may be resold for the balance of the 
mortgage debt owing to Walker Bank. 
Spaulding's redemption was a valid redemption, 
and vested title to the property in him. The redemption 
by Spaulding should be held valid as against the Re-
spondents for the following reasons: 
1. The redemption met the statutory requirements 
as set out in Rule 69 (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
2. Spaulding was the mortgagor of the property 
redeemed; 
3. Spaulding was a named defendant in the fore-
closure action brought by Walker Bank (R 15); 
4. The stipulation between Walker Bank and the 
Clawsons gave any priority to the interest held by 
Walker Bank in the property, including any interest 
in a deficiency judgment; 
5. The Clawsons failed to make any attempt to-
wards redeeming the property, thereby waiving ail 
rights to the property; 
6. Even if Spaulding had not been entitled to re-
11 
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deem, the acceptance of his payment by the foreclosure 
sale purchaser barred any claims by Respondents: 
"Also, the liens of all those junior encumbrancers 
or judgment creditors who were parties to the 
suit and who might have redemmed but failed to 
do so have been held to be barred . . . it would 
seem, in case of redemption by one not authorized 
to redeem, when his payment is accepted as a re-
demption by the foreclosure sale purchaser." 59 
C.J.S., Mortgages Section 875 (c) ; and 
7. Spaulding was personally liable on the mortgage 
debt and therefore was an interested party able to 
redeem. Iowa law, on which Section 78-37-6 of the 
Utah Code Annotated is based, would seem applicable 
here. In McLean v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 
130 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. Iowa, 1942), the court described 
the factual situation as follows: 
"Here was such a [mortgage! debtor and had 
become personally liable for a deficiency of 
$2,000.00 in consequence of this mortgage fore-
closure. H e had lost title through foreclosure of 
the second mortgage. The time for redemption as 
to the first mortgage had not expired when this 
petition was filed." Id. at 128. 
As will be observed, the factual situation is somewhat 
similar to that of the present case. The court went on 
to state: 
"When the mortgaged land is sold by the debtor, 
a right of redemption passes to the buyer, but the 
debtor still has an equitable interest (arising from 
his liability for a deficiency judgment) which en-
titles him to intervene in a foreclosure action, and 
12 
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a right of subrogation (as to redemption from a 
first mortgage) where deed has passed under 
foreclosure of a second mortgage. It thus appears 
that the statute and decision law of Iowa recog-
nizes an equity in the mortgage debtor in relation 
to the property and redemption, which equity 
exists even where he has parted with title, will-
ingly, or through foreclosure of the junior mort-
gager Id. at 127-8 (Emphasis added). 
However, as the District Court stated in its Order, 
(R 97), the redemption by Spaulding was valid. The 
District Court erred by failing to recognize that the 
prior junior encumbrance of the Clawsons had been 
extinguished by the foreclosure proceedings and by the 
Clawsons' failure to redeem the property from the fore-
closure sale. 
P O I N T I I I . T H A T R E G A R D L E S S O F ANY 
I N T E R E S T S O F R E S P O N D E N T S I N T H E 
S U B J E C T P R O P E R T Y A F T E R T H E F O R E -
CLOSURE P R O C E E D I N G S I N S T I T U T E D BY 
W A L K E R BANK, W A L K E R BANK H A D 
T H E R I G H T TO E X E C U T E ON S P A U L D -
ING'S R E D E E M E D P R O P E R T Y BY REASON 
O F I T S D E F I C I E N C Y J U D G M E N T . 
Regardless of the priorities between the parties 
in the subject property, Walker Bank still had the right 
to execute on Spaulding's redeemed property as a junior 
lien holder at least. I t is generally recognized law that 
a junior lien holder has the right to execute on his lien. 
Therefore, if after the Walker Bank deficiency judg-
13 
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ment was entered, Walker Bank assumed the position 
of a junior lien holder, subordinate to the interests of 
the Respondents in the property, then Walker Bank 
still had the ability to foreclose as a junior lien holder. 
59 C.J.S., Mortgages Section 522 explains the relative 
rights of the part is: 
"As a general rule, the rights of a senior mort-
gagee or other encumbrancer are not affected by 
the foreclosure of a junior mortgage; the sale 
must be made subject to the lien of his mortgage 
or encumbrance, and he retains the right to en-
force it as before." 
Therefore, even if Walker Bank should be held to be 
a junior lien holder at the time the deficiency judgment 
was entered, Walker Bank still retained the right as 
a junior lien holder to foreclose on its junior lien. 
P O I N T IV. T H A T T H E W A L K E R B A N K 
D E F I C I E N C Y J U D G M E N T ON T H E SUB-
J E C T P R O P E R T Y H A D P R I O R I T Y OVER 
ANY I N T E R E S T O F T H E R E S P O N D E N T S . 
Not only were the interests of Respondents in the 
subject property extinguished by Walker Bank's fore-
closure proceedings, and by Respondents' failure to 
redeem; but the inerests of Walker Bank in the subject 
property never ceased throughout the various proceed-
ings. From the date that Walker Bank instituted its 
foreclosure proceedings, it had retained a superior in-
terest in the property, up to and including the time of 
sale on the deficiency judgment. 
14 
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PlaintifFs-Respondents rely heavily on the Oregon 
court's opinion in Ulrich v. Lincoln Realty Co., supra, 
as authority for the theory that their judgment lien 
must be superior to the deficiency judgment following 
the foreclosure sale. However, the holding of the Ore-
gon court specifically excludes the type of situation 
found in the present case. That court explained that its 
holding would probably not be applicable in a situation, 
like the present one, where the judgment creditor—Re-
spondents here—has been made a party to the foreclo-
sure suit. 
"One of the consequences of this doctrine is that 
a party obtaining a judgment against the mort-
gagor while the foreclosure suit is pending would, 
in case of redemption by the mortgagor or his 
grantee, have a lien superior to that of a defici-
ency judgment rendered in the foreclosure suit. 
At least this is true if such judgment creditor has 
not been made a party to the foreclosure suit." Id. 
at 150 (Emphasis added). 
In view of the fact that Respondents have specifically 
been made parties to the foreclosure suit (R 15), the 
Ulrich decision, by its own specific language, is irrele-
vant to the present situation. 
In addition, the Clawsons have previously stipu-
lated in their action with Walker Bank that the interests 
of Walker Bank in the subject property were superior 
to those of the Clawsons (R 56). That stipulation is 
evidence of the fact that the interests of Walker Bank 
were intended by both Walker Bank and the Clawsons 
to be superior to any interests claimed by the Clawsons. 
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Such a relationship would apply not only to the original 
foreclosure proceedings but also to the deficiency judg-
ment. This court must hold that the superior interest 
of Walker Bank was retained throughout the deficiency 
judgment proceedings not only by virtue of the stipu-
lationlation entered into by the parties, but also by 
virtue of law. Although Respondents would have the 
court believe that no jurisdiction recognizes a redemp-
tion as reviving the original mortgage lien to the extent 
of the deficiency, such is simply not the case. Osborne 
on Mortgages, Section 309 (2nd Ed. 1970), states that 
the authorities hold that after redemptoin by the mort-
gagor, "even the lien of the mortgage under which the 
property was sold revives as to the unpaid deficiency." 
Id. at 642. Osborne goes on to state: 
"Although the cases holding that redemption re-
vives the original lien under which the property 
was sold, except to the extent that the purchase 
price on the sale discharged it, are those involving 
< judgment liens, no distinctions between them and 
mortgage liens can be upheld. New York is, per-
haps, the leading jurisdiction for this doctrine, 
[citations omitted!" Id. at 642, Note 63. 
Several New York decisions support the position that 
a redemption by the mortgagor revives the original 
mortgage lien to the extent of the deficiency. In Matter 
of Hunter v. Seery, 206 App. Div 19 (1923), the court 
held that where the land sold for a sum which did not 
satisfy the judgment, the redemption by a subsequent 
grantee of the owner from the purchaser at the execu-
tion sale restored the lien of the judgment, and that the 
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land might be sold again to satisfy that judgment. In 
Titus v. Lewis, 3 Barb. (N.Y.) 70, 72 (1848), the 
court held that: 
"By the very terms of this enactment, the re-
demption under the first sale rendered that sale 
null and void, and, b}^  necessary consequence, 
there having been no sale in law, there was no ex-
tinguishment of the judgment lien upon the 
premises." 
And, according to the note at 9 Cornell Law Quarterly 
208 (1924), "all the succeeding cases in New York 
have followed the construction of the statute laid down 
by these two cases." The Walker Bank deficiency judg-
ment on the property therefore had priority over any 
interest of the Respondents in the property, for three 
principal reasons: 
First, Respondents Clawson had been specifically 
named as parties in the original foreclosure action 
(R 15), thereby precluding application of the rule of 
the Ulrich case; 
Second, Respondents Clawson had stipulated with 
Walker Bank that the Clawsons' interest would be sub-
ordinate to that of Walker Bank (R 56); and 
Third, there is a recognized body of law holding 
that a redemption of property executed upon revives 
the original mortgage lien to the extent of the defi-
ciency. 
The interest of the Clawsons, if it was not extin-
guished by the foreclosure proceedings themselves, was 
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and must remain subordinate to the interests of Walker 
Bank and, by line of title from Walker Bank, to the 
interests of Appellants Moesser. 
CONCLUSION 
The foreclosure proceedings instituted by Walker 
Bank in 1969 effectively discharged all encumbrances 
of Respondents in the subject property. The interests 
of Respondents in the subject property were in the 
nature of a junior encumbrance, by virtue of the stipu-
lation entered into by Respondents Clawson on October 
25, 1969. Such junior encumbrances are held by law 
to be discharged against the property by foreclosure 
proceedings by a senior encumbrancer. That is what 
happened in the present situation. 
As a result, Respondents had no interests at all 
in the subject property when C. H . Spaulding redeemed 
the property from the foreclosure sale on June 30,1970. 
The property vested in Spaulding, and Respondents 
had to look for any satisfaction to the surplus monies 
in the foreclosure fund, their rights to the subject 
property itself having been extinguished by the fore-
closure proceedings. Walker Bank then executed on 
the property once again held by Spaulding, and the 
property was sold by Sheriff's sale to Appellants Moes-
ser, in whom the title now rests in fee simple. 
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Even if the court should hold that Respondents 
retained some interest in the subject property after the 
foreclosure proceedings, it must also be held that 
Walker Bank did also, even if only as a junior encum-
brancer. I t is the law in the State of Utah that a junior 
encumbrancer may foreclose or execute on property in 
which it has a valid interest. In other words, at the very 
least Walker Bank had the right to execute on Spauld-
ing's redeemed property by reason of the Walker Bank 
deficiency judgment. 
Last, it must be pointed out that Respondents' 
argument that their judgment lien must be superior to 
the deficiency judgment following the foreclosure sale, 
is inapplicable to the present case. The Walker Bank 
deficiency judgment retained its vitality in the present 
case, and did not become subordinate to the interests 
of Respondents for the reasons that: (1) the Clawsons 
had been specifically named as parties in the original 
foreclosure suit; (2) the Clawsons had stipulated with 
Walker Bank that their interest was subordinate to 
that of Walker Bank; and (3) the law recognizes that 
a redemption of property executed upon revives the 
original lien to the extent of the deficiency. 
In view of the facts and the law applicable to the 
present case, the court must find that the interest of 
the Appellants Moesser in the subject property is 
superior to that of the Respondents, if indeed the Re-
spondents retained any interest at all in the subject 
property after the original foreclosure proceedings were 
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concluded. Therefore, jvidgment of the lower court 
must be reversed, and judgment must be entered in 
favor of the Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J E N S E N & L E W I S 
Kay M. Lewis 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 ., : 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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